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Abstract
Deciding on the development path of the economy has been a delicate question in eco-
nomic policy, not least because of the trade-off effects which immediately worsen certain
economic indicators as steps are taken to improve others. The aim of the paper is to present
a framework that helps decide on such policy dilemmas. This framework is based on an
analysis conducted among OECD countries with the FOI model (focusing on future, out-
side and inside potentials). Several development models can be deduced by this method,
out of which only the large corporation-based, bureaucratic model is discussed in detail.
The large corporation-based, bureaucratic model implies a development strategy focused
on the creation of domestic safe havens. Based on country studies, it is concluded that
well-performing safe havens require the active participation of the state. We find that, in
countries adhering to this model, business competitiveness is sustained through intensive
public support, and an active role taken by the government in education, research and de-
velopment, in detecting and exploiting special market niches, and in encouraging sectorial
cooperation.
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I. Introduction
As growth rates have slowed across the developed world since 2008, the topic of economic
development has become more relevant than ever. Governments across the globe seem to
be struggling to find the right economic policy instruments that will make their economies
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more dynamic. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature of economic develop-
ment by identifying crucial development factors, and describing a special development
path that we call the large corporation-based, bureaucratic model.
The method used to deduct the large corporation-based, bureaucratic model is called the
FOI model. It was developed by the authors within the framework of a research project
funded by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund between 2009 and 2013. The FOImodel
is based on the assumption that there are several ways to achieve economic development.
Its structure was formulated in such a way as to make it possible to capture the significant
differences in the development paths taken by different nations. Using the sample of the
OECD countries, we detected three viable development paths, one of them being the large
corporation-based, bureaucratic model.
The large corporation-based, bureaucratic model is characterised by a strong and compe-
titive business environment, but the countries choosing this path are also characterised
by a strong state presence. We used country studies to be able to show how these two
elements can be combined successfully, and our findings may therefore be used to shape
economic policy decisions.
II. Growth and development in economics
Growth and development are mentioned almost as synonyms in this paper, although the
literature usually addresses them separately. The simplest approach is to say that growth
is the narrower, and development is the more complex class, as growth is usually defined
as an increase in certain quantitative variables, while development describes a process of
moving from a lower level of quality to a higher one (Szentes, 2011). As the measurement
of the phenomena economics usually deals with is in any case problematic, the most
popular, formalised growthmodels (e.g. Domar, 1947; Harrod, 1948; Solow, 1956; Romer,
1986 and Lucas, 1988) concentrate on national income or on its per capita version. These
models thereforemap the problem of growth/development through the quantitative change
of a single indicator, so they offer tools to analyse the problem of growth, the narrower
category.
However, GDP – being an aggregate indicator – veils more profound processes that
are crucial for development, such as the structure of the economic system, changes in
employment, income distribution or the institutional framework, etc. For this reason, we
will from now on use the more complex approach to development whenever we touch
upon issues of growth and/or development paths, factors of growth and/or development,
meaning that we interpret development as a combination of two things: growth in the
indicators of national income, and the modernising of the socioeconomic structures.
Theories of development
Different schools of economics have different views on the rules of the economy, and
neither do they agree on the basic assumptions; hence, a wide variety of theories have
been developed over the centuries. While most schools implicitly assume that the models
used are universal, List (1841) was convinced that the classical theories may only apply
to the most developed economies; the followers of new institutionalism (see Williamson,
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2000, for example) point out that the institutional structure of different countries can be
very different. A similar confrontation can be observed regarding development paths. It
is widely accepted that development is unilinear, meaning that all countries have to go
through the same development stages (with timing being the only difference among them).
Veblen (1919), on the other hand, argued against the teleological approach of economics,
and suggested an evolutionary one instead.
It worth mentioning that mainstream theories do not consider the effects of national
interests and bargaining power in theirmodels; heterodox schools, on the other hand, cannot
accept the independent development of countries (although there is no agreement among
them considering the exact nature of the interdependencies). It may seem natural to choose
the countries and national economies as the unit of analysis; Wallerstein (1974), however,
when describing the economic history of medieval Europe, concludes that modernisation
cannot be understood within the framework of the national economy. He instead chooses
the world system as the unit of analysis.
Some scholars have developed models with few explanatory factors; others have gone
for more variables. The well-known growth theories pick one or two variables; Porter’s
diamond model (1990) combines four quite complex factors; the empirical study of Barro
(1998) of 100 countries over 30 years finds seven factors that are strongly connected to
the growth rate of real GDP.
The factors of development identified in economics literature can be categorised along
many principles, but the location of factors is probably the most important dividing line.
One camp of economists traces back differences in economic development to reasons
that can be found inside the country. They point to factors whose presence (e.g. physical
or human capital) or lack (e.g. government failures) enables high growth rates. Another
group of economists finds the causes of underdevelopment in outside factors. Usually
these theories take the differences in the development level as given in the world economy,
and they assume that these differences lead to asymmetric dependencies. The asymmetric
dependencies, on the other hand, make it very difficult for underdeveloped countries
to catch up with the rich world. The inside-outside distinction among the factors of
development plays a crucial role in the model developed during our research.
The inside factors of development
Adam Smith (1776) saw the division of labour as the main source of wealth. Those
countries that are able to extend the division of labour among their firms and citizens can
become wealthier, as they are able to produce greater quantities from the same labour
input. The main finding of the Harrod-Domar model (1947, 1948) is that investments are
the key to economic growth. Investments, however, are mainly dependent on the savings
rate. Around a decade later, Solow (1956) pointed out that investments and savings cannot
contribute to growth in the long run. In his view, long-term economic growth is driven by
technical change.
Keynes (1936) suggested that crises are generated by limits in demand, and the latter may
be strengthened by large income differences. The speculative demand for money of those
who are well off can be especially high, which prevents a substantial part of the income
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from turning into effective market demand. Inequalities in income distribution can thus
be a setback for balanced growth.
Schumpeter (1934) stressed that cyclical fluctuations should be regarded as a natural
part of the economy, as entrepreneurs may only draw profits if they break the status quo
of equilibrium. The way to break the status quo is through innovation, which therefore
becomes the primary driver of cyclical development. McClelland (1957) also emphasised
the importance of the entrepreneurial class. In his view, entrepreneurs are the pioneers of
development, and their biggest motivator is not profit, but the achievement of some special
goals (N-achievement).
When the big colonial empires collapsed, several academics explained the situation of the
underdeveloped former colonies with a value system and social structure that was different
from the Western one. In underdeveloped countries the rural characteristics of society are
dominant, meaning that labour is inefficient, immobile, the social structure is rigid, and
the general attitude rejects individualism and risk taking (Meier, 1964). When local values
confront Western values, society is split into two groups, and a dual social structure is
formed (Boeke, 1953), a state which is completed with a dual economic structure (where
the traditional and modern sectors are insulated from each other).
The role of human capital in growth and development is highlighted in various forms in
the literature. Szentes (2011) quotes from A. Marshall: from a national perspective, the
capital invested in workers’ children is just as productive as capital invested in horses
or machinery. Newer theories unquestionably suggest that capital invested in children
is far more productive than that invested in horses and machinery. Endogenous growth
theories see increasing returns as a prime source of long-term growth, and they directly or
indirectly explain increasing returns with human capital. Lucas (1988) treats human capital
as reproducible, an element of capital that the society is able to broaden at a constant rate.
The expansion of human capital, on the other hand, leads to a constant increase in the
productivity of physical capital. Romer (1986) can also be connected to human capital. In
his model, investments made in research and development produce positive externalities
that enable a constant increase in the productivity of physical capital.
Veblen (1919) points out that human behaviour is deeply affected by institutionalised
rules of society. His views were taken over by new institutional economists (e.g. North,
1993; Williamson, 1998). According to them, institutions affect the incentive system of
an economy, while the incentive system, on the other hand, influences the behaviour, size
and competition of firms, the level of investments and technological development, and so,
ultimately the level of development of an economy. Underdevelopment is thus explained
by institutional frameworks consisting of bad incentives, according to the new institutional
school.
Partially connected to the institutional approach is the theory of government failures,
which was mainly brought to the attention of development experts by Tullock (1993). It
was back in the 1960s that Tullock (1967) suggested that the super profits that monopolistic
structures offer can be an incentive for firms to lobby for government regulations granting
monopolistic positions and monopoly profits. According to calculations made by Krueger
(1974), the rent-seeking behaviour of firms in the field of import licences caused a 7.3%
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GDP loss in India, and a 15% GDP loss In Turkey in 1964. The more corrupt a country is,
the weaker the state is, the heavier the costs of rent seeking are, and so rent seeking can
be one of the major obstacles of economic development.
Porter’s (1990) national competitiveness theory adds some highly complex factors to the
literature of economic development. A somewhat similar idea is suggested by Freeman
(1987), who developed the theory of national innovation systems. These systems are cent-
red on cooperation among businesses, the education system and the research infrastructure.
The outside factors of development
The theory of comparative advantage developed by Ricardo (1817) was one of the corner-
stones of the laissez-faire approach of international relations. According to Ricardo, the
highest welfare level can only be ensured if trade is conducted along the lines of compara-
tive advantages and there is a free flow of goods. This free trade principle was questioned
by many. List (1841) argued against laissez-faire. He defended protectionism, and sugges-
ted protective tariffs for newly-established industries (the infant industry argument). His
suggestions echoed those of Alexander Hamilton (1791) made in the newly-formed USA.
After the Second World War, the focus of development economics shifted towards the
power relations of different countries. Prebisch (1964) and Myrdal (1957) point out that
underdeveloped states are dependent on richer countries, and so the current system of
international division of labour is not based on comparative advantages. The internal
economic structures of most developing countries are directly influenced by the developed
ones through the colonial system (Myrdal: forced bilateralism). Balogh (1963) argues that,
as a result of power inequalities among parties, the economic structure of the developing
countries has to be adjusted time after time to take into account the changes generated
by technical progress made in the developed economies, and the adjustment process
prevents them from achieving long-term growth. Dependency relations lead to one-track
specialisation (Singer 1964). The majority of exports of the developing countries are
primary products and commodities, which leads to a decrease in the terms of trade over
the long run. Bhagwati, in his 1958 paper titled “Immiserizing growth”, showed that the
decrease in terms of trade can result in a decrease in the national income even if there
is dynamic growth in the production of the export sector. One lesson learned from the
literature of interdependencies is that a diversified export structure can be an important
development factor.
Emmanuel (1972) has gone so far as to claim that trade between developing and developed
countries is an unequal exchange, which is a manifestation of the imperialism of trade.
Unequal exchange was triggered by wage differences, and is sustained by the immobility
of labour. Wallerstein (1974) also accepted the concept of unequal exchange, although he
argued that it is a result of the different bargaining power of nations. The core-periphery
relations and the geographical position basically predestine the fate of nations, according
to Wallerstein.
As the role played by transnational companies in the international flow of goods and
capital became more and more dominant, a great deal of attention was directed towards
them. Furtado (1970) suggested that the most important development factor is no longer
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interdependencies among countries, but the investment strategies of transnational com-
panies. Transnational companies can bring capital to a country, creating jobs, but the
newly-formed subsidiaries may be isolated from the local economy (Singer 1964). The
ability of a country to attract foreign capital, especially if the capital is invested in fields
that can fit in well with the current economic structure of the economy, is another important
development factor.
The demonstration effects of modern consumer societies are also worth mentioning. Ge-
nerally, the consumers of the developing countries try to follow the consumption patterns
of the developed nations. This usually has a cut-down effect on local growth, as the goods
most fitting to current consumption trends are generally produced overseas, so following
the trends increases imports, and can contribute to the trade balance deficit.
Table 1: Inside and outside development factors
Inside factors Outside factors
Division of labour (Smith)
Free trade – international division of labour
(Ricardo)
Savings rate (Harrod-Domar) Protectionism
Abundance-scarcity of capital Defence of infant industries (List)
Equal-unequal income distribution
(Keynes)
Equal or unequal trade partners (Balogh)
Pressure to fit to modern patterns (Balogh)
Drive to innovate (Schumpeter)
Unilateral dependency – diversification
(Myrdal)
Entrepreneurial behaviour (McClelland) One-sided specialisation (Singer)
Rigid-flexible social structure (Meier)
Imported or organically developed social
structures (Boeke)
Immiserising growth – terms of trade
(Bhagwati)
Forced bilateralism (Myrdal)
Dual-homogeneous economic structures
(Meier)
International wage division- mobility of
labour (Emmanuel)
Investment into human capital (Marshall)
Human capital as a renewable resource
(Lucas)
Positive externalities of R&D (Romer)
Geographical position – core and periphery
(Wallerstein)
Institutional incentives (North)
Path-dependent development
Investment strategies of multinational
companies (Furtado)
Government failure (Tullock)
Rent-seeking (Krueger)
Demonstration effect
National diamond (Porter)
Innovation systems (Freeman)
Rule of law, democracy (Barro)
The role of institutions in development
According to the followers of the institutional school, institutions affect human behaviour;
in other words they influence the decisions of economic agents. Veblen was the first to
point that out (1919), and also added that it is an oversimplification to assume that market
decisions can be analysed independently from any other outside factors, like family, culture,
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community, politics, etc. His views were neglected bymainstream economics, but the topic
was brought to the forefront again by two new research agendas.
On the one hand, it was proved by a series of psychological experiments that we are
not capable of making such rational decisions as is assumed by economics. The notion
of homo economicus was debunked by the theory of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957).
Agents with bounded rationality behave opportunistically. On the other hand, Coase’s
pioneering article (Coase, 1937) shed light on the fact that the transactions conducted
among agents are not frictionless, and, depending on the rate of frictions, very different
market solutions may prove to be the most efficient ones. If we take a closer look at
market transactions, it becomes clear that there are numerous social phenomena that are
disregarded by mainstream economics, yet they influence the opportunistic behaviour of
market agents and the rate of frictions during transactions. These social phenomena are
collectively called institutions.
Hodgson defines institutions (2006) as systems of established and prevalent social rules that
structure social interactions. According to the definition above, language, money, etiquette,
the measurement system, and firms can all be regarded as institutions. Institutions make
it easier to calculate and forecast the behaviour of agents, and thus they contribute to the
decrease of uncertainty and frictions during transactions. North (1993) offers a similar
definition of institutions: institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more
formally, are the human-devised constraints that shape human interaction.
Williamson (1998) suggested a hierarchy that proved very useful during our analysis.
He separated social analysis into four levels (Figure 1). The different levels are ranked
according to the time needed to change them, but they also show what influences what
in the society. Higher levels directly influence the level just below them, meaning that no
practices may be adopted on the lower levels that are not compatible with the superior
levels. Social embeddedness is at the top of the hierarchy (L1). Williamson puts norms,
customs, ethical principles, traditions, conventions and religion into this category. Some
development factors found in the literature at least partly belong to this level (e.g. the dual
structure of the society, entrepreneurial behaviour).
The institutional environment forms the second level (L2). While informal rules were
placed in Level 1, the rules of L2 are formal, codified ones (e.g. constitution, laws, property
rights). Although the change of Level 2 rules is also partly evolutionary in nature, calculated
interference is also possible on this level (unlike on L1). Such interferences are called first-
order economising, which is about finding the ideal combination of formal rules. Many of
the development factors belong to the institutional environment: the rule of law, democratic
rights, market regulation and protectionism.
First-order economising, however, does not ensure the optimal economic structure. As
agents behave opportunistically, they do not keep to the formal rules of the economy all
the time. Jurisdiction also has its frictions, meaning that those who follow the rules are
not always able to enforce their rights against opportunists instantly and without any costs.
This is where the third level (L3) kicks in, called governance by Williamson. The unit of
analysis in governance is the transactions made among economic agents, and the contracts
mediating those transactions. Such development factors as the coordination of education
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and research, Porter’s national diamond, government failures or rent seeking, can all be
reckoned among L3 items.
The final level (L4) is concerned with the allocation of resources, an area which is
traditionally addressed by neoclassical economics. The factors of the better-known growth
theories (quantities of labour and capital, savings, investments, etc.) all belong to this level.
Williams thinks that new institutional economics addresses problems belonging mainly
to Levels 2 and 3. North’s and Hodgson’s definitions cited above, however, suggest that
all phenomena belonging to L1, L2 and L3 can be regarded as institutions. This paper
therefore treats all factors as institutional factors that can be categorised in one of the top
three levels of Williamson’s hierarchy.
Figure 1: Economics of institutions
Source: Williamson, 1998, p. 26
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III. Methodology
Structure of the model
To identify the crucial development factors of Hungary, and in order to sketch potential
development paths for the country, we developed the FOI model. The model is primarily
based on the factors collected from the literature, but these factors are structured in
a unique way which allows us to draw up characteristic development paths that can be
clearly separated from each other.We used the following assumptions when the FOI model
was set up:
• National economies are the unit of our analysis; international interdependencies
are mostly disregarded in the paper.
• The key to development is not a single factor, but rather a combination of many
factors. According to our assumption there are several important motors of deve-
lopment; sometimes these factors influence each other, and it is very difficult to
determine what causes what; still, they can be equally important, and they all have
to be used to draw up a potential development path for Hungary.
• Among the many factors considered in the model, the so-called institutional factors
play a primary role. Institutional factors are detected using the hierarchy put forward
by Williamson (1998). In fact, the model was developed with the aim of stressing
the importance of institutional factors in development.
• Development can take more than one shape and form. There are several feasible
development paths, and Hungary is not constrained to follow only one of them, but
may choose from a (limited) number of such paths. To determine these development
paths, the FOI model was used to test OECD countries.
The FOI model offers a new typology of development factors, but is also capable of
structuring these factors along three clear directions of development. As shown previously,
the inside-outside typology of development factors is a standard part of the literature. The
FOI model, however, is based on a three-dimensional structure. These three dimensions
are:
• F, i.e. the future potential of a country;
• O, i.e. the outside potential of a country;
• I, i.e. the inside potential of a country.
All three dimensions are complex and composed of a large number of factors. However,
they can still be clearly distinguished from each other, which is useful because this clear
distinction can help in the formulation of distinctive development strategies.
Future potential includes factors that are regarded as crucial for the sustainability and
future competitiveness of the Hungarian economy. As sustainability has become one of
the main paradigms of all social sciences, we felt that the inclusion of it as a separate
development dimension was essential. In our case, sustainability translates to ensuring
that the typical signs and indicators of a developed country characterise not only the
current state of the economy but also the relatively distant future.
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Outside potential includes factors crucial to the current world market position of Hungary.
This second dimension can be treated as equivalent to the outside factors listed based
on the literature. Some elements of the outside potential may not be influenced from the
inside; others, such as the conditions affecting the international flow of goods, services
and factors of production, are a standard part of economic policy.
Inside potential is made up of factors that are regarded as crucial to the current well-being
and development of Hungary. Most of the inside factors listed in Table 1 fall into the cate-
gory of this potential. Countries which offer favourable conditions to local entrepreneurs,
and provide a high level of quality of life to their inhabitants, can have remarkable inside
potential.
It is not difficult to spot that certain trade-offs exist among the three potentials. Higher
wage levels, for example, are absolutely favourable from the perspective of inside poten-
tial, but they can be dangerous for the outside potential of the country. They can also be
threatening to future potential, if the result of a high wage level is overconsumption. If
a country is well endowed with natural resources, this can boost its inside and outside
potentials, but the abundance of resources usually leads to high proportions of waste,
which again harms future potential. The three potentials were drafted with these trade-offs
in mind.
Formulating a measurement method
During a brainstorming session a list of 50 indicators was compiled with the help of
experts. These 50 indicators were chosen to measure the relevant development factors
and were all included in a questionnaire. Experts were asked to rank all 50 indicators on
a 1–7 scale (1 = not at all relevant; 7 = of highest significance). Each indicator received
three separate scores: one for future potential, one for outside potential and one for inside
potential. The respondents had to give a high score to an indicator if they believed it
greatly contributed to the sustainability and future competitiveness (F potential), current
world market position (O potential) or current well-being (I potential) of Hungary. The
questionnaire was completed by 28 experts. Most were active members of the Committee
on Future Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Representing several acade-
mic fields (arts, engineering, medicine, natural and social sciences), they offered a wide
perspective and a strong future-oriented attitude, values that are highly useful in this kind
of research.
During the processing of the questionnaires, every indicator was placed in the group (F,
O or I potential) where it scored highest, meaning that an indicator could only be part
of one of the potentials. In order to eliminate some of the less important factors (which
received low scores in all three dimensions), we disregarded everything that had a score
below average. The final transformation left us with 27 factors: 12 of them influence the
future potential, 10 the inside and 5 the outside potential (Table 2).
DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, 5 (1), 1–20
DOI: 10.2478/danb-2014-0001
11
Table 2: The components of the future, outside and inside potentials
Future potential Outside potential Inside potential
Social responsibility (L1–3) Trade to GDP ratio (L3–4)
Burden of government
regulation (L2–3)
Industrial disputes (L1) Country credit rating (L4) Quality of life (L4)
Energy infrastructure (L3) Exchange rate stability (L3)
Collected total tax revenues
(L3)
Total public expenditure on
education per capita (L3)
Financial institutions’
transparency (L3)
Pension funding (L2–3)
Ageing of society (L1–2) English proficiency (L4) GDP (PPP) per capita (L4)
Renewable energies (L3) Real GDP Growth (L4) Healthy life expectancy (L3)
Ease of access to loans (L3) Ecological footprint (L1–2) Rigidity of employment (L3)
Total expenditure on R&D per
capita (L3)
Labour force (L4)
Total R&D personnel
nationwide per capita (L3)
Skilled labour (L3)
Educational assessment /
Mathematics (L3)
The final version of the model was fine-tuned using statistical data from OECD countries.
IV. FOI analysis of OECD countries
To quantify the future, outside and inside potentials, the FOI-indices were calculated. The
value of the 27 components (listed in Table 2) were gathered for all 34 OECD members
for the year 2010, and then all values were transformed to a 1–7 scale using the min-max
method. By averaging the standardised values, we were able to calculate the F-, O- and
I-indices of all 34 countries (Table 3).
Table 3: The F-, O- and I-indices of OECD countries
F O I F O I
Australia 4.20 5.32 4.35 Japan 4.80 3.68 4.01
Austria 4.70 5.41 4.05 South Korea 4.00 4.26 3.33
Belgium 3.90 5.56 3.47 Luxembourg 5.30 6.56 4.45
Canada 3.90 5.41 4.50 Mexico 2.70 3.98 2.85
Chile 3.80 5.03 4.13 Netherlands 4.40 5.54 3.83
Czech Republic 3.10 4.97 3.57 New Zealand 4.20 4.52 4.00
Denmark 4.80 5.77 4.30 Norway 5.20 5.70 4.13
Estonia 3.00 4.94 3.08 Poland 2.90 4.42 3.07
Finland 5.00 5.72 4.02 Portugal 3.50 4.33 2.91
France 4.40 4.46 3.04 Slovakia 3.00 4.82 3.25
Germany 4.30 5.26 3.73 Slovenia 3.40 5.08 2.70
Greece 2.90 3.66 2.50 Spain 3.40 4.23 2.99
Hungary 2.90 4.56 2.55 Sweden 5.10 5.22 4.13
Iceland 5.90 2.33 4.42 Switzerland 5.40 5.37 4.89
Ireland 3.90 4.17 3.91 Turkey 3.30 3.63 3.14
Israel 3.60 4.89 4.13 United Kingdom 3.90 4.35 3.60
Italy 3.50 3.82 2.66 USA 3.80 4.27 4.47
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Factor analysis
In order to better understand what background factors drive the value of the different F-,
O- and I-indices, a factor analysis was conducted with SPSS 19. Almost 150 variables
were tested during the analysis. In the first step, we checked how closely related those
variables are to the three index values in OECD countries, and what the direction of the
relationship is. As a second step, all variables were only considered in the factor analysis
of the index they had the highest correlational relationship with.
We were able to establish three main groups of indicators that showed a significant
correlation with the index of the future potential of OECD countries. They were labelled
Human capital, Accountable corporations andQuality of the education system. TheHuman
capital factor is a combination of indicators measuring the education and health sectors,
and productivity. The Accountable corporations factor combines such factors as the ethical
and social responsibility of organisations and the credibility of managers, and so represents
the social, ethical and environmental considerations of businesses. The third factor, Quality
of the education system, shows the returns on efforts made in the education system.
Two factors were found with the factor analysis of the O-index, namely National goodwill
and Investment conditions. The main distinction between the two factors is the timeframe
within which their indicators may be influenced by the decision maker. The Investment
conditions factor includes variables that can be influenced relatively easily, even over the
short term; the National goodwill, on the other hand, may only be changed over the very
long term.
Variables having a significant correlation with the I-index can be separated into three
factors. These factors were labelled Business competitiveness, Government intervention
and Availability of resources. The Business competitiveness factor measures the micro-
economic position of all businesses (small and medium-sized enterprises and large cor-
porations) along such dimensions as productivity, efficiency and R&D&I. The other two
factors describe the macroeconomic environment of the businesses, where the Govern-
ment interventions consists of the regulation part and the Availability of resources the
allocation part.
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Table 4: The factors of the F-, O- and I-index
F-index O-index I-index
F1 Human capital O1 National goodwill I1 Business competitiveness
Labour productivity (PPP)
Overall productivity (PPP)
Total health expenditure per
capita
Total public expenditure on
education per capita
Healthy life expectancy
Total expenditure on R&D per
capita
Parallel economy
Investment risk
Image abroad
Country
credit rating
Brain drain
Risk of political instability
Innovative capacity
Productivity of companies
Small and medium-size
enterprises
Information technology
Large corporations
F2 Accountable corporations O2 Investment conditions I2 Government intervention
Ethical practices
Social responsibility
Credibility of managers
Foreign investors
Exchange rate stability
Capital markets
Investment incentives
State ownership of enterprises
Subsidies
Finance and banking
regulation
Protectionism
Legal and regulatory
framework
Ease of doing business
Bureaucracy
F3 Quality of the education
system
I3 Availability of resources
Educational assessment /
Mathematics
Educational assessment /
Sciences
Science in schools
Educational system
Labour force
Total primary energy supply
per capita
Burden of government
regulation
Employment rate
Gross domestic savings
F-index: KMO = 0.823, explained proportion 76.4%; O-index: KMO = 0.803, explained
proportion 73.7%; I-index: KMO = 0.791, explained proportion 73.408%3
Forming clusters
The FOI-indices and the factors determined during the factor analysis were used to identify
typical clusters within OECD countries. These artificial clusters were created based on the
values of the F-, O- , and I-index, with the so-called half-scale method. As the indices can
have a value between 1 and 7, 4 is the mid-value. So all three indices were split into two
groups: the values from 1 to 4 went into the group labelled as “low” (1), while the values
above 4 were labelled as “high” (2).
Theoretically, all 8 clusters could represent feasible combinations, butmost of the 34OECD
members fall into 4 groups (the distribution is shown in Table 5). In our interpretation these
3 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value helps in determining how suited our variables are to factor analysis.
A KMO value above 0.8 means that the variables are highly suitable. Principal component analysis and Varimax
rotation were used during the analysis.
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four groups of countries represent the development models within the OECD. The current
paper focuses on group nr. 7, which is called the large corporation-based, bureaucratic
model. As half-scaling was used as a method of clustering, it is obvious that Belgium,
France, Netherlands, Ireland, South Korea and New Zealand perform above average in
their future and outside potential.
A closer inspection of the factors shows however, that these countries are especially strong
on the field of Accountable corporations, while their Human capital endowments and
the Quality of the education system (the other factors of the F-index) are barely above
average. The factors of the O-index show a balanced performance. Group nr. 7 is below
average in the I-index, but a more sophisticated picture can again be drawn based on
the factors: Business competitiveness is above average, but the factors describing the
macroeconomic environment (Government intervention and Availability of resources)
indicate below average performance.
Table 5: The clusters of OECD countries according to the half-scale method
Code Country
1 (111) Greece, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Turkey
3 (112) Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
5 (211) United Kingdom
6 (212) Iceland
7 (221) Belgium, France, Netherlands, Ireland, South Korea, New Zealand
8 (222) Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, United States
The F-, O- and I-index values indicated in brackets, where 1 = countries with index values
between 1 and 4 ; 2 = above 4 . No countries fell into group 2 and 4 .
Group 7 is called the large corporation-based, bureaucratic model for two reasons. On the
one hand, these countries perform really well in two factors measuring the performance
of the business sector (they excel in Accountable corporations and are above the average
in Business competitiveness). On the other hand, they fall below average in the regulatory
environment and in the availability of local resources (both indicate the presence of ex-
tensive state regulation that often overwrites market decisions).
V. The large corporation-based, bureaucratic model as a development strategy
The cluster and factor analysis based on the FOI-indices led us to three promising de-
velopment models (cluster 3, 7 and 8). The paper discusses the large corporation-based,
bureaucratic model in detail, which implies a defensive strategy that is focused on the cre-
ation of local safe havens. In other words we argue that, if the goal is to move towards the
large corporation-based, bureaucratic model, then economic policy should primarily be
defensive and protectionist, concentrating on creating an environment for large domestic
corporations that at least partially protects them from global competition.
By drawing a parallel between the development model (deducted from the clusters of
countries) and economic policy strategy, we can also tell which factors are most important
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for the local safe haven-oriented defensive strategy. Based on our analysis, we can tell those
factors in which the countries belonging to different clusters (which represent possible
development models within the OECD) perform exceptionally well. These outstanding
factors then can be rendered to the development strategies. For the countries belonging to
Cluster 7, the outstanding factors are the following: F2 Accountable corporations; I1 Busi-
ness competitiveness; I3 Availability of resources (the latter factor also has a significantly
high value for cluster 8).
As a next step, we checked which of the OECD members scored well in these three
factors, and which of them has a comparable size to Hungary. Finland is number one in F2
Accountable corporations among OECD countries. Denmark is second, Austria is third in
I1 Business competitiveness, while Norway is fifth in I3 Availability of resources. Country
studies were prepared of the four countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland and Norway) to
detect those best practices that allowed them to excel in the areas measured by the key
factors listed above. The country studies are fairly extensive and therefore cannot be
included in the paper, but the lessons learned from them are featured in the final sections
(the country studies are accessible in the Appendix of Bartha, Gubik and Tóthné Szita,
2013). The final goal is to use the FOI analysis and the country studies to offer relevant
policy recommendations for Hungary.
A defensive strategy focused on the creation of local safe havens
As part of a strategy focused on the creation of local safe havens, the state is committed to
creating and sustaining a regulatory safety net that enables a well-functioning corporate-
enterprise sector (with the emphasis being on large national corporations). According to
our model, the strategy is best described by the accountable (F2) and competitive (I1)
business sector. The availability of resources (I3) is also key, however this factor is also
featured in another strategy represented by Cluster 8.
Table 6: Development areas for a strategy focused on the creation of local safe havens
Level Component
L1 Value system characterised by low level of power distance
Feminine culture
Long-term orientation in resource management*
L2 Social acceptance of entrepreneurs*
L2–L3 transition Supportive role of the state
Favourable business environment*
L3 Education system supporting the needs of the business sector
Ease of starting new businesses, assistance provided for new entrepreneurs
L4 R&D&I incentives
Supporting cluster development
Avoiding price competition by making use of special market niches
Extensive ITC use
Geographical position, exploiting domestic endowments
Qualified and productive labour force*
*Key components of cluster 8 as well.
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Hungary performs rather poorly in the key factors of the strategy focused on the creation
of local safe havens. It is ranked 20th in Accountable corporations (F2), 26th in Business
competitiveness (I1), and 33rd (last but one within the OECD) in Availability of resources
(I3). There is plenty to be done if the local safe haven strategy is chosen. Table 6 contains
those key components that were collected from the country studies (analysing the best
practices of countries doing exceptionally well in factors F2, I1 and I3). They can set
the development priorities for a local safe haven-oriented economic policy strategy. The
components are presented in the hierarchical order suggested byWilliamson (see Figure 1).
According to our country studies, the low level of power distance and the feminine nature
of the culture are the most deep-rooted elements of this strategy. Both contribute to the ac-
countability of firms. The low power distance, because the horizontal employee-employer,
company-stakeholder, company-supplier relations make it possible for less powerful par-
ties to have a say in the principles according to which the companies are managed. The
feminine culture, because it represents a high level of social solidarity, an element that is
crucial to the social responsibility of companies.
These two components, however, are ranked at the highest level of Williamson’s hierarchy
(L1), which means that the chance of influencing them is minimal. However, they still
have to be mentioned, as the nature of the hierarchy is that the components high up
have an effect on the lower levels (which are easier to manipulate). A decision has to be
made whether or not it is possible to balance the lack of L1 components with lower level
changes, and whether or not the strategy can be successful without having the proper L1
cultural elements in place, before any steps are taken to move the economy toward the
large corporation-based, bureaucratic model. For example, the lack of trust which can be
a consequence of a masculine culture (L1), might be replaced by such formal governance
structures (L3) as can minimize transaction costs.
The long-term orientation towards resource management is also on the top level of the
hierarchy. The responsible and sustainable use of natural resources is partially dependent
on the institutional structures (L2, the vision driving long-term government decisions), but
long-term orientation is a characteristic of the society as a whole (see Cernic, 2012, for an
example on the importance of long-term orientation). Norway offers prime examples of
this, be it the management of oil extraction, or the preservation policy followed regarding
the renewable resources possessed by the country. But Norway’s efforts in sustainability go
way beyond the national borders. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland offered a great
example of the international role played by Norway in matters of sustainability when she
participated in the drafting of the report titled Our Common Future. The main message of
the report, a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, p. 27), has become
the most often quoted definition of sustainable development.
A critical element of the institutional structure (L2) for the strategy focused on the creation
of local safe havens, is the social acceptance of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial beha-
viour in general. This component can be influenced, and, through education and proper
communication, the attitude towards entrepreneurship can be changed within a reasonable
amount of time (although this still means several years, possibly decades).
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The supportive role of the state is also key to this strategy. This factor is only part of the
institutional structure, so it was put as a transition element between Levels 2 and 3. In
Finland, for example, the country that is first in Accountable corporations, government
support was crucial in establishing world-leading social responsibility practices. It is
also worth mentioning that the state’s role is more that of night-watchman, focused on
coordination and harmonization, rather than direct control (according to the WTI, the
tax burden of Cluster 7 countries is not significantly high within the OECD, Machova-
Kotlan, 2013). The favourable business environment is also part of the L2–L3 transition
level, which is driven by the good availability of resources, on the one hand, and by the
regulation of the state, on the other.
On the level of governance (L3), the following are the key ideas: what are the administrative
costs of starting and operating a private business; and what is the state’s contribution to
the competitiveness of domestic companies. The technical and administrative costs of
starting a new business in Denmark are minimal. Furthermore, new entrepreneurs receive
consultancy services partially funded by the central budget. Norway, where starting a new
business is also cheap and quick in international comparison, excels in the availability of
financial resources (availability of credit and risk capital).
The structure and the efficiency of the education system is also crucial to the competi-
tiveness of the business sector. The country studies of both Austria and Denmark shed
light on the importance of ITC use and foreign language skills alongside a high level
of professional skills. The traditional educational system and lifelong learning structures
both contribute to good performance in these fields. Denmark’s example also shows how
the involvement of stakeholders contributes to higher quality in education. Parents and
students, through school councils, and companies, through apprenticeship programs, have
a say in key education matters (such as curricula, student schedules, apprenticeship).
Level 4 (L4) covers those components related to the allocation of resources in general,
and especially to labour market issues. A change on this level can have immediate effects.
One of the key elements on L4 is cluster development. Clusters play an important role
in the economy both in Austria and in Denmark. Industry-level cooperation has great
traditions in both countries, so the development of clusters is a result of a natural process.
Formal automotive industry cooperation has a 100-year history in Austria, and the Danish
agribusiness, wind power and pharmaceutical industry clusters are also good examples of
such development.
Competitiveness is sustained through the setting of proper development priorities, and
government incentives for R&D&I. R&D spending in Austria has grown the fastest within
the European Union. Private funding of R&D is on the rise as well, a process that is driven
by tax benefits and direct transfers. As a result of public support, cooperation between
private firms and universities and research institutes is getting stronger. Although it has
to be mentioned again, that cooperation is also strengthened by cultural elements. The
low power distance (Hofstede, 2001) and the horizontal nature of relationships (in which
Austria ranks first, Denmark third) both help a lot.
Austria and Denmark can rely on their developed physical infrastructure, and can ex-
ploit their geographical position and unique endowments. Stressing the importance of
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uniqueness is also part of their market strategy. Many Austrian firms, for example, try to
make use of special market niches, and so can avoid global price competition. They operate
in traditional industries, where special knowledge is needed, and high market share can be
achieved because of the high quality of the products.
Last but not least, the highly qualified and efficient labour force is also a key L4 component
(although this is also a significant factor of Cluster 8). Some lessons to be learned from the
Norwegian country study include: the identifying and prioritising of fields of education
(mathematics, natural sciences and entrepreneurial studies in the case of Norway); high
involvement in lifelong learning; high proportion of GDP spent on education.
VI. Conclusion
The large corporation-based, bureaucratic model requires a defensive strategy focused on
the creation of local safe havens. This model can also be interpreted as a modern version of
protectionism. It can be characterised by a well-functioning large corporation sector, but
this is partially due to the high level involvement of the state. This is important in the global
environment, because the state can create a sort of safe haven for domestic companies. It
is unclear, however, just how long this safe haven can be sustained in a global environment
where state regulation is becoming more and more uniformalised.
According to our country studies, by supporting cooperation between firms, among firms,
universities and research institutes, cooperation within clusters, the economic policy of
a country canmove toward a strategy focused on the creation of local safe havens. Intensive
public support is required to sustain the competitiveness of the corporate sector, which
is partially achieved by creating and sustaining a reliable incentives environment (e.g.
intellectual property rights, start-up regulation, flexible labourmarket, financial resources),
and partially by taking an active role (e.g. education, R&D funding, infrastructure).
The role of the state can also be extended on the identification and exploiting of unique
endowments (e.g. special national goods, market niches). This can be done through con-
sultancy services, or through providing publicly funded added value (e.g. marketing), or
even through providing public support to encourage entrepreneurial involvement.
The other cornerstone of the strategy is an education system that provides such competitive
skills and knowledge that suit the needs of large corporations, but also help people if they
want to become self-employed. An education system like that can set the supply to the
needs of the labour market, can involve the stakeholders of the system (parents, students
and companies), and can offer a reliable alternative for teachers.
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